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Privileged Communications:
A Proposal For Reform

Leslie Katz*

The privileged communications rules may prevent a party to litigation from bringing into evidence matters he wishes to bring. His
inability to do so may lead to a result less favourable to him than that
which he would have obtained had a claim of privilege not barred his
way. This different result may not only put him in a worse position
than he would otherwise have been in, but may have harmful consequences for others as well, consequences which may be too subtle
even to detect at the time the privilege is exercised.
How likely is it that the privileged communications rules will
lead to such unfortunate consequences? In this connection, three
mitigating factors may be mentioned: first, the privileged communication would have been of insufficient weight to affect the result in
some of the cases in which privilege keeps it out; secondly, the party
against whom a claim operates may have other admissible evidence
which will prove the point he has been foreclosed from making by the
claim of privilege; thirdly, if compelled to testify regarding a confidential communication, an unwilling witness may perjure himself
and, if his evidence is believed, the party extracting it may actually
have worsened his position rather than bettered it by attempting to
exploit the absence of a privilege for the communication.
With respect to the first two factors, it should be noted that even
those commentators who are strong opponents of the principle of
privileged communications rules have admitted that certain of the
rules are not significantly obstructive. Wigmore, speaking of the
lawyer-client privilege said, "[Tihe loss to truth [it causes] is comparatively small. .

.,
"I

and McCormick, although disagreeing with

Wigmore regarding the obstructiveness of the lawyer-client
privilege, considered the marital communications privilege "less
obstructive" than the lawyer-client one. 2 McCormick took the same
*Leslie Katz, Lecturer in Law, The University of Sydney. Mr. Katz thanks the Law

Reform Commission of Canada for permission to make use in the preparation of this
note of research undertaken by him for the Commission.
1. 8 Evidence s. 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

2. "Law and the Future: Evidence" (1956), 51 Nw. U. L. Rev. 218, 220.
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view regarding priest-penitent privilege, while Bentham, called by
Wigmore "the greatest opponent of privileges," said in support of a
priest-penitent privilege that the "advantage gained by . . . [its
absence]. . . would be casual, and even rare. . . "3 With respect to

the third factor, common law authorities describe the privileged
communications rules as being designed not to protect against the
reception of unreliable evidence, but rather to exclude what would
have been reliable evidence for the purpose of promoting other
interests. 4 Thus they consider the rules a hindrance to accurate
fact-finding. The Europeans take a different view. 5 They recognize
that when a witness, because of his relationship with the communicator, would be under an almost irresistible temptation to perjure himself if compelled to testify as to a communication, he might
as well be granted a privilege with respect to the communication in
order to avoid erecting the collateral matter of his credibility into the
prime issue in the litigation. Reasoning of this sort motivated English
legal thinkers as well at one time in their decision to render a husband
6
or wife incompetent to testify for or against his or her spouse.
Let us assume now that none of these three factors is relevant in a
particular piece of litigation, in other words, that a witness would
testify truthfully as to a communication if compelled and that his
evidence would be crucial to the conclusion of the litigation. On what
basis, if any, ought we nevertheless to exclude it?
Any discussion of the rationale for doing so must, for custom's
sake at least, start with Wigmore's four conditions necessary to
establish a privilege for communications 7 : (i) The communications
must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed; (ii) This
element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties; (iii) The relation
must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulouslyfostered; (iv) The injury that would inure to the relation by
the disclosure of the communications must be greaterthan the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
These conditions have been criticized for their extreme ambiquity and it has been suggested that they could justify great expansion
3. Op. cit., at s. 2396.
4. Crim. Law Rev. Comm., Evidence (General) (1972), Cmnd. 4991, para. 19.
5. D. W. Louisell, "Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion; Privileges in
Federal Court Today" (1956), 31 Tulane L. Rev. 101.
6. Hawkins v. U.S., 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958).

7. Op. cit., at s. 2285.
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of the privileged communications rules. 8 On the other hand it has
been suggested that there is no class of relation, no matter how
socially useful, in respect of which the absence of a privilege for
confidential communications would be so harmful that people would
not continue to enter into it in spite of the privilege's absence. 9 If this
were true, as it may well be, then no class of relation could ever
satisfy Wigmore's second condition and the law of privileged communications as we now know it would pass entirely from the scene. It
is submitted therefore that we ought to turn our attention from
Wigmore's formulation of the rationale for privileged communications rules, which consists essentially in using the rules as an encouragement to the public to enter into socially beneficial relations which
would not otherwise have been entered into, and seek a new rationale
for them.
Wigmore himself may provide a convenient starting point.
Arguing for the retention of a lawyer-client privilege, he says that:
[I]t must be repugnant to any honourable man to feel that the
confidences which his relation naturally invites are liable ... to
be laid open through his own testimony. He cannot but feel the
disagreeable inconsistency of being at the same time the solicitor and the revealer of the secrets of the cause. This doubleminded attitude would create an unhealthy moral state in the
practitioner. Its concrete impropriety could not be overbalanced
by the recollection of its abstract desirability. If only for the sake
of the peace of mind of the counsellor, it is better that the
privilege should exist. 10
In other words, one of the costs of not privileging confidential
communications to lawyers would be the assault on the peace of mind
of the lawyer should he be required to testify when he felt obliged not
to. Of course, not only the legal profession's peace of mind is capable
of being assaulted by compulsion to testify in these circumstances. It
should be noted in this connection that recent amendments to the law
of evidence in England now allow a husband or wife in civil proceedings to refuse to answer any question or produce any document or
thing if to do so would tend to expose his or her spouse to subsequent
criminal proceedings."' In Continental countries, a witness is excused from answering a question that would tend to incriminate not
8. "Functional Overlap between the Lawyer and other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine" (1962), 71 Yale L. J. 1226,
1230.
9. Morgan, "Foreword" inAmerican Law Institute Model Code ofEvidence 17-22.
10. Op. cit., at s. 2291.
11. Civil Evidence Act, 1968, s. 14(l)(b).
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only his spouse, but other relatives as well. 1 2 It is submitted that
witnesses other than lawyers and relatives could appropriately be
relieved of the trauma of being forced to incriminate other persons by
means of repetition of communications made to them in confidence.
If this reasoning is not considered sufficiently persuasive to
justify the granting of privileges on a large scale, or if the recipient is
willing to testify, is there any other reason why we ought not to
compel him to do so and ought even to prevent him from doing so? It
is submitted that there is.
When discussing the justification for not compelling an accused
person to testify at his trial, some commentators declare that it would
be too great a violation of the dignity of even a guilty person to make
him compellable, since then he would be forced to choose between
lying to exculpate himself and telling the truth to convict himself. If
he chose the former, as he would be greatly tempted to do so, he
would then be liable to prosecution for perjury. 13 This concern for the
dignity of even the guilty accused has manifested itself in the United
States in the exclusion of involuntary confessions made by accused
persons even if true.1 4 Such an approach has not found favour in
6
Canada, 15 although it is submitted that it ought to.'
We have scientific evidence which indicates that disclosure of
personal information to intimates, family and close friends, is systematically related to mental and possibly physical health. 17 We can
therefore argue that such disclosure is in a sense compelled, not by
external pressures but by internal ones. In the same way that we ought
to recoil from using against an accused person communications made
by him to persons in authority which were compelled from him by
force, we ought to recoil from using against him communications,
made by him to intimates, which he was compelled to make to
preserve his health. This reasoning would justify the current
husband-wife, priest-penitent and doctor-patient privileges' 8 as they
12. D. R. Coburn, "Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil
the Child" (1970), 74 Dick. L. Rev. 599, 600 n. 5.
13. G.A. Martin, "The Privilege against Self Incrimination Endangered" (1962), 5
Can. Bar J. 5.
14. Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1630 (1966).
15. R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.R. 272.

16. See the dissenting judgement of Cartwright, C.J.C., ibid., at 275; D. W.
Roberts, "The Legacy of Regina v. Wray" (1972), 50 Can. Bar Rev. 19.
17. A. F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum, New York, 1967) 54.

18. These privileges all exist in at least one Canadian jurisdiction. As to the first,
see, e.g., the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E- 10, s. 4(3). As to the second,
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apply in criminal (including quasi-criminal) proceedings, and was
impliedly recognized to be sound by Wigmore. In speaking of the
rationale for a priest-penitent privilege, he said, "In criminal cases it
would be impolitic to encourage a resort to this too facile channel of
confessions."19
Other communications which were not compelled from a person
in this sense may have been compelled in the sense that he had to
make them to obtain benefits he could not obtain by his own efforts
because he did not have the necessary skills. To obtain from the
recipients of these communications made by an accused person
evidence as to them is to take unfair advantage of the accused's
compulsion to communicate because of lack of skills to further the
chances of his conviction. This reasoning justifies the current
lawyer-client and doctor-patient privileges as they apply in criminal
(including quasi-criminal) proceedings, and has been accepted in an
analogous sphere, that of search and seizure, by two American
Supreme Court Justices in dissent in Couch v. U.S. 20 In that case the
issue was the ability of the government to seize a person's business
records from her accountant, to whom she had delivered them for the
purpose of having him prepare her tax returns. The majority's sanctioning of the seizure of the records was based on a finding that the
owner of the records had not expected their contents to remain
confidential when she surrendered possession of them. 2 1 They were
careful to point out, however, that they were not holding that the
author of documents could never object to their seizure out of the
hands of another. 22 Douglas, J., disagreeing regarding the owner's
intentions, stated:
Our tax laws have become so complex that very few taxpayers
can afford the luxury of completing their own returns without
professional assistance. If a taxpayer now wants to insure the
confidentiality and privacy of his records, however, he must
forego such assistance. To my mind, the majority thus attaches a

see, e.g., the Newfoundland Evidence Act, R.S.N. 1952, c. 120, s. 6. As to the
third, see the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, art. 308(2). See also the Canada

Evidence Act, s. 37, and the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s.
53(2), both of which provisions render the priest-penitent and doctor-patient
privilege applicable in at least some federal proceedings.
19. Op. cit., at s. 2396.
20. 93 S. Ct. 611 (1973).
21. Ibid., at 618- 6 20.

22. Ibid., at 620, n. 20.
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penalty to the exercise of the privilege against selfincrimination. It calls for little more discussion than
23 to note that
we have not tolerated such penalties in the past.
Marshall, J., also in dissent, referred to "a person's right to develop
for himself a sphere of personal privacy" and saw the problem in the
case before him as one of developing criteria for deciding whether
evidence sought to be seized by the government fell within or without
that sphere. His quarrel with the majority concerned their failure to
articulate criteria for making such a decision and he suggested a
number of them: the nature of the evidence, the ordinary operations
of the person to whom the records were given, the purposes for which
the records were transferred and the steps the author took to ensure
their privacy. With respect to the third criterion he stated:
that a transfer is compelled by practical considerations if the
author is to claim benefits available under the law seems to me
quite important. If petitioner had sought to take advantage of
some complicated provision of the tax laws and needed the help
of an accountant to do so, I would be quite reluctant to hold that
the transfer of her records was a surrender of the privacy of her
papers . . . As I understand 24it, the majority . . . recognize the
importance of this criterion.
If the learned justices took this view with respect to an owner's ability
to object to the seizure of her personal records out of the hands of
another person to whom she had delivered them in order to avail
herself of a skill of that other person which she herself did not
possess,2 5 they would presumably take the same view with respect to
the seizure of her written communications to that other person regarding her situation. If they would forbid the seizure of written communications from the hands of the recipient, they would presumably
excuse the recipient of the communications from being required to
testify as to their contents. That being so, they would presumably
excuse him from testifying as to an oral communication made to him
in order to enable him to perform a service for the communicator
which she could not perform for herself. Justice Douglas apparently
recognized the soundness of this chain of reasoning when, in discussing "the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may

23. Ibid., at 623.
24. ibid., at 627.
25. Of course, the issue which arose in the Couch case could not even arise in
Canada, given the current state of the law of search and seizure. See the Ouimet
Committee Report, at 64-65.

Privileged Communications: A Proposal for Reform 603

lead a private life,"' he pointed out, "One's privacy

. . .

has a very

meaningful relationship to what he tells any confidant ... "26
Apropos the Couch case, the American Law Institute has recently been engaged in drafting a Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure and it has dealt therein with permissible objects of search
and seizure. The Code excludes from search and seizure "...
personal diaries, letters, or other writings or recordings, made solely
for private use or communication to an individual occupying a family, personal or other confidential relation, other than a relation in
criminal enterprise, unless such things have served or are serving a
substantial purpose in furtherance of a criminal enterprise. "27
It is submitted that such a proposal is readily transferable to the
area of testimonial privilege. A rule of privileged communications
ought to be formulated which allows an accused person to prevent
from being used against him evidence as to any communication he
made to another person in an expectation of confidentiality so long as
that expectation was justified in the circumstances. Such a rule would
constitute society's guarantee that it would not seek convictions
either by putting recipients of such communications in an intolerable
position or by relying on communications the accused reasonably
expected would remain confidential and which he was compelled to
make. It would recognize a sphere of privacy surrounding a person
which extended beyond his self and took in other persons who
constitute an extension of his self for the purpose of receiving confidential communications. It would not discriminate among various
sorts of relationships, ascribing higher value to some than to others as
the present rules do, but would rather focus on the value of the
relationship from the point of view of the communicator.
If such a rule were appropriate in criminal cases would it not also
be appropriate in civil cases? It might be argued that if it is improper
for society to advanct its own claims by the use of a particular sort of
evidence, then it is just as improper for it to allow private individuals
before the courts to advance their claims by the use of that sort of
evidence. This suggestion has, however, never been accepted. For
instance, while an accused person cannot be compelled to testify at
his trial, a civil defendant can. While a statement which constitutes an
involuntary confession is, absent the existence of subsequent confirming facts, inadmissible at a criminal trial, it is admissible at a civil
26. op. cit., at 623.
27. Proposed Official Draft No. 1, (1972), Section SS 210.3(2).

604 The Dalhousie Law Journal

trial. 28 The reason for this distinction is said to be that "[i]n a
prosecution the Court is not adjusting rights between two persons
S..29 When it is,
truth can be bought at a greater cost. Thus it is
submitted that the policy to be followed with respect to the privileged
communications rules is that they should be broadened as to the
classes of relations to which they apply in criminal cases and removed
in civil cases.
Such a policy would obviously lessen whatever obstructive
effect there is to the current privileges, since objection could only be
taken to answering questions regarding confidential communications
whose repetition would incriminate the communicator.
Furthermore, it is suggested that if evidence as to the communication were sought in a legal proceeding other than the criminal trial
of the communicator, such evidence should be admitted, but that
neither it nor its fruits should be admissible in a criminal trial, should
one follow. This limitation on the use of the fruits of the incriminating
evidence would be broader than the limitation now imposed on the
prosecution with respect to the use that may be made of selfincriminating answers by witnesses, but it is submitted that the
limitation suggested here is the only sound one. The opinion of
Falconbridge, C.J.K.B., with respect to the protection offered to a
witness by the immunity now conferred in the federal Evidence Act
is, it is submitted, appropriate, namely, that it "does not afford
sufficient immunity

. .

.The prosecutors might well get information

from him which would enable them to get convicting evidence
aliunde without using his own evidence against him at all."a° In any
event, such a scheme would be less obstructive than one which
excused the witness from answering the question altogether.
28. Tompkins v. Ternes (1960), 32 W.W.R. 299 (Sask. Q.B.D.)
29. Hurst v. Evans, [1917] 1 K.B. 352, 357.
30. Quoted in Re Ginsberg (1918), 38 D.L.R. 261, 267 (Ont. C.A.).

